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DAMAGES
A. Fraud and Deceit
It is well established in South Carolina that the elements of
actionable fraud are (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) his
intent that it should be acted upon; (6) the hearer's ignorance
of its falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance on its truth; (8) the
hearer's right to rely thereon; and (9) the hearer's consequent
and proximate injury.' Actual knowledge need not be established
if the misrepresentation is made of the speaker's own knowledge
with a reckless disregard as to its truth.2 The measure of dam-
ages is the difference between the actual and the represented
value, or the so-called "loss of bargain rule."3
In Young v. Goodyear Service atores4 the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of punitive damages where
a vendor sold as new a second hand washing machine and failed
to explain how his allegedly innocent mistake was brought about.
The defendant contended that while liability for actual dam-
ages arises in an action for fraud and deceit when a false
representation is recklessly made, in order for punitive damages
to be imposed there must be actual knowledge. The court held,
however, that the test for exemplary damages included not only
intentional conduct, but also that which could be characterized
as reckless, willful, or wanton as judged by the standard of the
reasonably prudent man.
In a somewhat similar case the South Carolina Supreme
Court held in Corley v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co.5 that fraud
could be inferred from an insurer's attempted settlement of a
claim for a sum over 2,000 dollars less than the amount owing
under a life insurance policy, and that an award of punitive
damages was not error.
In South Carolina it seems clear that given facts which wil
support an action for fraud and deceit a fortiori a claim for
punitive damages is proper, for in a sense the requirements are
the same, i.e., either actual knowledge and intent or reckless con-
1. Tallevast v. Herzog, 225 S.C. 563, 83 S.E2d 204 (1954).
2. Aaron v. Hampton Motors, Inc., 240 S.C. 26, 124 S.E2d 585 (1962).
3. Warr v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 237 S.C. 121, 115 S.E.2d 799
(1960).
4. 244 S.C. 493, 137 S.E.2d 578 (1964).
5. 244 S.C. 1, 135 S.E.2d 316 (1964).
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duct. In some states however the rule of Derry v. Peek," which
excludes negligent misrepresentation from the action of fraud
and deceit, is accepted.7 Also many jurisdictions apply the "out
of pocket rule" which allows the difference between the value
of what was parted with and the value of what was received.
8
While this measure of damages is consistent with the tort forms
of action and is fair when the defendant's conduct was merely
negligent, in many cases where the wrongdoer acted intentionally
or recklessly he could escape liability, i.e., where the value re-
ceived was worth the price paid. Dean Wigmore9 has suggested
that the proper measure of damages would be achieved by use
of the "out of pocket formula" for negligent conduct, and the
"loss of bargain rule" for willful or reckless misrepresentations.
The idea in the former is to restore the plaintiff to his original
position, while in the latter situation he will be given the value
of the expected bargain. Wigmore admits however that since
most states allow punitive damages for willful or reckless fraud,
the cheater will probably be amply punished under either rule.
It should be noted that in most states Wigmore's suggestion is
achieved, in substance if not in form, for with negligent mis-
representation an action for rescission and restitution will lie,
and there the "out of pocket rule" is applied. 10
B. Excessive Damages
The rule as to excessive damages in South Carolina is that
the South Carolina Supreme Court will not set aside a verdict
merely because the amount indicates undue liberality on the part
of the jury. That power, exercised either by setting the verdict
aside or by granting a new trial nisi, rests solely with the trial
judge. It is only when the verdict is so grossly excessive as to
indicate that the jury was moved by passion or prejudice, or
rather is such that it shocks the conscience of the court will it
be set aside on appeal."
In Watson v. Wilkinson Trucking Co.12 the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed an award of 40,000 dollars where the
6. 14 App. Cas. 337, (1889).
7. PROSSER, TORTs § 102, at 720 (3rd. ed. 1964).
8. Id. § 105, at 750.
9. MCCORIMic, DAM.AGES § 121 (1935).
10. See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 105 (3rd ed. 1964).
11. Nelson v. Charleston & W. C. Ry., 226 S.C. 516, 86 S.E2d 56 (1955).
12. 244 S.C. 217, 136 S.E.2d 286 (1964).
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plaintiff had received a severe aggravating injury to his back
which had been permanently damaged some fourteen years
before. The court found that while the pre-existing injury was
severe, the plaintiff had made a normal adjustment to it; but
because of the negligence of the defendant, he now had a rup-
tured disc which would be of a permanently disabling nature.
The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to all proximate
damages, including those resulting from aggravation of a pre-
existing condition, 13 and that while the award was substantial,
it bore a reasonable relationship to the character of the injury.
A verdict of 25,000 dollars was sustained in Oliver v. Blak-
eney14 for a whip lash injury. The plaintiff was a young woman
with a calculated life expectancy of 50.37 years. Before the acci-
dent she was regularly employed at a weekly salary of forty-six
dollars, but following it she had a total loss of wages for eight
months and could work only part time. The medical testimony
was to the effect that her injuries were of a permanent nature.
C. Additur
In Hatchell v. McCracken'5 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that in an action for unliquidated damages, an in-
crease in the jury award by the trial judge constituted reversible
error where the plaintiff was not given the option of a new trial.
The court relied primarily upon the case of Dimick 'v. Sohiedt'0
in which Mr. Justice Sutherland said that to allow additur
would violate the seventh amendment's guarantee of a jury trial
in civil cases. He reasoned that there is a distinction to be made
between excessive and inadequate judgments. In the former case
remittur merely removes an excess and that the remainder can
be said to have been found by the jury. But in the latter situ-
ation the increase can in no regard be said to have been in-
cluded in the verdict. He concluded that to deny the plaintiff
a new trial merely by reason of the consent of the defendant
to an increase would deny the plaintiff's constitutional right
to the verdict of a jury.
Generally it can be said that the cases outside the federal
courts' 7 are widely split on this issue with the weight of au-
13. 15 Am. Jim. Damages §§. 80-81 (1938).
14. 244 S.C. 565, 137 S.E.2d 772 (1964).
15. 243 S.C. 45, 132 S.E.2d 7 (1963).
16. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
17. The seventh amendment is not as yet made obligatory on the states. See,
e.g., Spiers v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
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thority favoring the view taken in the present case. s18 However,
the distinction made in the Dimicek case is somewhat strained.
If remittur is allowed without the consent of the defendant, it
seems somewhat illogical not to allow additur without the con-
sent of the plaintiff. In both situations the aggrieved party has
a recourse. In the former situation the defendant may appeal
on the ground that the verdict is still excessive, and conversely
in the latter the plaintiff may appeal from what he still con-
siders an inadequate verdict.1 9
D. Eminent Domain
Generally when land is taken for public use, the landowner is
entitled to compensation not only for the land taken, but also
for the damage to his remaining land. The right to recover
for the damage to his remaining land is not based upon the
theory that this is a taking; and the damage need not be peculiar
and special. The entire parcel is considered as a whole and the
jury must decide how much the taking of a portion has de-
creased the value of the whole.20 With this general rule in mind,
the only South Carolina case on property taken by eminent
domain which was reviewed by the South Carolina Supreme
Court during this survey period may be considered.
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Bolt21 involved a con-
demnation proceeding brought by the respondent state highway
department to acquire a right-of-way for the construction of a
controlled-access highway across the property of appellant James
W. Bolt. The jury assessed the damages at 13,900 dollars. The
landowner appealed primarily claiming that error was committed
in not allowing the jury to consider as an element of damage
loss of business and the cost of the construction of new buildings
to replace those allegedly rendered worthless by the acquisition
of the right-of-way. Bolt operated a commercial egg business
on the land not taken and at the trial he introduced testimony
to show that the close proximity of the new highway would so
adversely affect the productivity of the chickens as to completely
destroy his commercial egg business. His request that the jury
18. See generally 5 Am. JuR. 2d Appeal and Error § 946 (1962) ; Annot., 95
A.L.R. 1163 (1935); Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 399 (1951); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 872
(1951) ; 50 C.J.S. Juries § 128, at 855 (1947); 66 CJ.S. New Trial § 207, at512 (1947).
19. See Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854 (1957).
20. 18 Au. Jur. Eminent Domain § 265 (1938).
21. 242 S.C. 411, 131 S.E.2d 264 (1963).
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be instructed to consider loss of business as an element of dam-
age was refused and the supreme court of this state upheld the
decision of the lower court: "[It] is the general rule that injury
to or loss of business ... is not considered as an element of dam-
age in eminent domain proceedings in the absence of a statute
expressly allowing such damages."22 But it was held proper for
the jury to consider such loss as it affected the market value
of the remaining property.
E. Computing Damages
An interesting decision, though not novel for this state, was
handed down in Edwards v. Eawton23 in which an appeal was
taken from a verdict for the plaintiff on the grounds that plain-
tiff's counsel was allowed over defendant's objection to show that
the per diem formula was a good method of computing plaintiff's
pain and suffering. The South Carolina Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that to allow the use of the per diem formula
for illustrative purposes, where the attorney was careful to point
out that only the jury could place a monetary value on pain and
suffering, was not error.
In Roberts v. Lawrence24 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that although a highway contractor's bond which made the
surety liable for reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in collecting
on the bond in case of default named only the highway depart-
ment or obligee, materialmen and laborers bringing a direct
action were also entitled to such costs.
In early 1964 Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co.2 5 presented a novel
question for our court concerning whether or not punitive dam-
ages were included under the Uninsured Motorists Act.26 The
South Carolina Supreme Court construed the statute as allowing
recovery for only those damages which were actual. The impact
of this decision was thwarted by the passage of an amendment to
section 46-750.11 which added punitive damages to the amount
of recovery under the act.
2 7
NANcy McCoy
F1n~x L. TAYLoR, JR.
22. Id. at 418, 131 S.E.2d at 267.
23. 244 S.C. 276, 136 S.E.2d 708 (1964).
24. 243 S.C. 158, 133 S.E.2d 74 (1963). The present case was distinguished
from Standard Oil Co. v. Powell Paving & Contracting Co., 139 S.C. 411, 138
S.E. 184 (1927).
25. 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-701 to -750 (1962).
27. S.C. CoDE AxN. § 46-750.31 (4) (Supp. 1964).
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